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Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is 
motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, 
the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of 
determinants of executive compensation. Previous studies also assume that the quality of 
compensation contracts is identical across executives. Based on unique data from our survey we 
create a quality index on each executive’s bonus plan. We conjecture that the pay to performance 
relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans. 
 
Our findings indicate that the pay to performance relation is weak and insignificant. Board size is 
the only corporate governance characteristic that explains variations in executive compensation. 
Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in 
executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations we do not find a stronger pay to performance 
relation in firms with better designed bonus plans. 
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Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms 
 
Introduction 
The compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) is topic of great interest to both academics 
and practitioners. A considerable number of papers have examined what explains the level of 
executive compensation. With a few exceptions, these studies are based on data from publicly 
traded firms (Cole and Mehran, 2008). We add to the literature by examining what explains the 
level of executive compensation among privately held firms. We analyse a comprehensive set of 
determinants of executive compensation. Further, as a unique feature of our dataset, we are able to 
evaluate the quality of each executive’s bonus plan. We are, therefore, able to explore if the 
expected positive pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans. In the 
following, we elaborate on each of these issues. 
 
The majority of papers which examine the determinants of executive compensation rely on publicly 
available data from listed companies. For example, Ke et al. (1999) argue that published studies on 
compensation in privately held firms are ‘essentially nonexistent because the data generally has not 
been accessible’. Cole and Mehran (2008) note that with a few exceptions, previous research on 
executive compensation focus on publicly traded companies that are required to file information on 
compensation with regulators. However, privately held firms have characteristics that deviate from 
listed firms and therefore may affect the design of compensation contracts. For example, the level 
of ownership concentration tends to be high in privately held firms as opposed to the often diffuse 
ownership structure of publicly traded firms (Ke et al., 1999). Thus, owners in privately held firms 
have better economic incentives to monitor the actions taken by executives (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). They also have better access to executives. These elements therefore tend to reduce the need 
for performance related compensation, and owners of privately held firms should be more likely to 
employ a forcing contract with penalty of firing (Ke et al., 1999). Ke et al. (1999) find a significant 
positive association between return on assets and the level of compensation for publicly traded 
companies. They find, however, no such relationship for privately held firms, which support the 
idea of the monitoring mechanism. 
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The few studies on privately held firms that examine determinants of executive compensation 
include a few explanatory variables only. As noted in Cole and Mehran (2008) data availability 
limit the number of testable hypotheses in privately held firms. Even studies that rely on publicly 
traded firms tend to focus on one or two groups of characteristics only. For example, Core et al. 
(1999) explore performance, board characteristics and ownership structures ignoring executive 
characteristics. Cole and Mehran (2008), on the other hand, look at executive characteristics and 
ownership structures but ignore performance and board characteristics. Examination of just a few 
characteristics in isolation ignores the fact that other non-measured characteristics may serve as 
complements or substitutes. Given the level of detail in the data we obtained from our survey, we 
are able to include a wide list of determinants which are expected to explain executive 
compensation. In addition to performance and board characteristics, we include executive 
characteristics such as ownership, education, executive position, and tenure. Furthermore, we 
include an indicator variable for the quality of the bonus plan as noted below. To our knowledge, 
this study is the most comprehensive study examining the determinants of executive compensation 
in privately held firms so far. 
 
Previous studies that explore the pay to performance relation assume that the quality of the 
compensation contract is identical across executives. We have detailed information on the design of 
bonus plans that allows us to rank them based on four unique characteristics. First, we consider 
bonus plans that rely on more than just one performance measure to be of higher quality than bonus 
plans that rely on only one performance measure. For example, Feltham and Xie (1994) argue that 
that most performance measures are incomplete or imperfect representations of the economic 
consequences of management actions. They recommend the use of more than just one performance 
measure; unless the performance measure is perfectly congruent and noiseless. Second, bonus plans 
that specifically consider the impact of both transitory items and changes in accounting policies on 
the performance measures adopted are believed to be of higher quality than bonus plans that ignore 
these issues. Third, Murphy (2000) find that income smoothing is prevalent in companies using 
internal standards (e.g. budget or last year’s financial results), but not in companies using external 
standards. Thus, bonus plans based on external standards are considered to be of higher quality than 
bonus plans that rely on internal performance standards. Finally, Healy (1985) and Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987) suggest that the pay to performance structure is linear since it mitigates the 
incentive to manage the performance measure. Thus, linear bonus plans with no cap or floor are 
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considered to be of higher quality than other bonus plans. In conclusion, we conjecture that bonus 
plans that include the above features are better designed and more accurately capture the value 
creation. This should improve the pay to performance relation as well. Murphy (1999) argues that 
more research is required to better understand the design of accounting-based bonuses. By carefully 
studying the design of each bonus plan, as outlined above, we believe that we meet this request. 
 
Most studies on executive compensation are based on either UK or US data. A comparison of the 
Danish and the UK and the US institutional settings reveals several differences that may affect what 
determine executive compensation. First, Firth et al. (1996) argue that Scandinavian countries 
(including Denmark) generally have a low variability in wage levels compared to other European 
countries and the US. Further, they conjecture that the lack of large differences in pay levels in the 
Scandinavian countries may be due to the state welfare philosophy, its tax system and the power of 
the trade unions. The low variability in compensation suggests that performance related pay is less 
frequently used or the resulting payoffs are small in magnitude. Second, the institutional setting in 
Denmark is characterised by a small open economy with a relationship-oriented corporate 
governance system, i.e. insider oriented (Eriksson and Lausten, 2000). This tends to reduce the 
information asymmetry and therefore the need for performance related pay. Third, Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1996) document that the existence of dual stock classes in Denmark is related to a higher 
level of shareholder concentration than in the UK and the US. The high level of ownership 
concentration leads us to believe that shareholders’ monitoring of management plays a larger role in 
Denmark than in the UK and the US. We conjecture that the monitoring mechanism will reduce the 
need for performance related pay. Fourth, Denmark has a two-tier board structure as opposed to the 
one-tier board structure in the UK and the US. Further, in Denmark CEOs are allowed to serve on 
the supervisory board but not as board chairman. This is in contrast to for example the UK and the 
US, where CEOs are also allowed to serve as the board chairman. These differences imply another 
board composition. For example, it is arguably less common to find an executive on a Danish 
board. Further, the degree to which an executive can influence board members is most likely 
smaller in Denmark than in the UK and the US, where executives also serve as board chairmen. In 
summary, we conjecture that the institutional differences may impact what determine variations in 
executive compensation in privately held firms in Denmark. 
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Since compensation data are not publicly available in Denmark, we collected the data through a 
questionnaire. Eventually 191 respondents completed the questionnaire. However, some 
respondents did not fill in the questionnaire in full leaving a final sample of 150 observations. Our 
data on compensation include insightful information on the various components of executives’ 
compensation contracts. 
 
Our results provide some interesting insights as to what explains executives’ compensation in 
privately held firms. In line with our predictions we find that the pay to performance relation is 
weak. We also find a stronger pay to performance relation for CEOs than for other types of 
executives. Board size is the only corporate governance characteristic that explains variations in 
executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills (size), executive position and 
educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Finally, we do not find a 
stronger pay to performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans. 
 
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. The next section develops our research 
hypotheses. In the third section the sample is described followed by a section outlining the research 
design. The descriptive statistics are provided in the fifth section, followed by the empirical results 
and robustness checks. Conclusions and suggestions for future research appear in the final section. 
 
 
Research hypotheses 
The compensation literature has expanded considerably over the last decade with an increasing 
number of studies trying to explain the level of compensation. In the following, we list a number of 
determinants that are likely to elucidate the cross-sectional variation in executive compensation. 
 
Pay to Performance relation 
Compensation is often seen as an instrument to align managerial interests (agents) with those of the 
shareholders (principals). The basic idea is to reward executives according to their performance. A 
vast number of studies have explored the pay to performance relation. In their seminal work Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) find that executive wealth in the US increases by $3.25 for every $1,000 
increase in shareholder wealth. They conclude that this increase is low. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
find a strong link between the fortunes of US executives and the fortunes of the firms they manage. 
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Studies outside the US document that the pay to performance relation is low or even negative. Zhou 
(1999) compares the pay to performance relationship in the US and Canada. He finds that the pay to 
performance sensitivity is considerably higher in the US than in Canada. Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) find that the US executive receives 4.18% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared to 
2.33% in the UK. A range of other UK studies also find positive but low pay to performance 
relations [Main et al. (1996), McKnight and Tomkins (1999), and Buck et al (2003)]. Brunello et al. 
(2001) on Italian data, Eriksson and Lausten (2000) on Danish data, Kato and Kubo (2003) on 
Japanese data and Kato et al. (2004) on Korean data all find positive but low pay to performance 
relations.  Analysing a sample of Norwegian and Swedish firms, Randhøy and Nielsen (2002) do 
not find any link between pay and performance. Fernandes (2008) reaches a similar conclusion 
based on a sample of Portuguese firms. Finally, based on Dutch firms Duffheus and Kabir (2007) 
find a negative pay to performance relation. Thus, although most studies find a positive pay to 
performance relation it seems low in most cases. 
 
We conjecture that the pay to performance relation is weak based on data from Danish privately 
held firms. While privately held firms are often characterised by high levels of ownership 
concentration publicly traded firms have more diffused ownership structures. Thus, owners in 
privately held firms have better incentives to monitor the actions of the executives reducing the 
need for performance related compensation. As mentioned in the introduction factors such as the 
relationship-oriented corporate governance system and the low variability in wage levels in 
Denmark, compared to other European countries and the US, reduce the use of performance related 
pay. Consequently, we expect a positive but weak pay to performance relation. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive but weak relation between firm performance and executive 
compensation 
 
Corporate Governance characteristics 
The literature on corporate governance examines the efficiency of alternative board characteristics 
and ownership structures. For example, Jensen (1993) argues that supervisory boards are ineffective 
when there is little equity ownership represented on the board, the CEO and the board chair is the 
same person, and if the CEO determines the agenda and the material presented at board meetings. In 
the compensation literature corporate governance parameters have been used to explain variations 
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in executive compensation. The basic idea is that inefficient corporate governance structures lead to 
excessive executive compensation. Core et al (1999) argue that no board characteristic and 
ownership structure would be significant in a setting where the executive’s compensation contract 
specifies the level of compensation as function of the firm’s performance in order to maximise firm 
value conditional of the firm’s informational environment and its demand for high quality 
executives. In this setting the board characteristic and ownership structure are simply ‘noisy 
measures’ of the same variables that determine executive compensation. However, in a setting 
where the compensation contract is not optimally designed, board characteristics and ownership 
structures are expected to affect the level of executive compensation. We explore different board 
characteristics and ownership structures that may affect the level of executive compensation. 
 
Large supervisory boards are likely to have a wider level of expertise. However, they can become 
so unwieldy that they become ineffective in monitoring executives (Jensen, 1993). Jensen (1993) 
points out that when the board exceeds seven or eight members they are less likely to function 
effectively and are easier for the executive to control. Yermack (1996) demonstrates how smaller 
boards are effective in enhancing firm performance. Holthausen and Larcker (1993) and Core et al. 
(1999) find that large US boards are associated with excessive compensation. These results are 
obtained in a one-tier board structure setting. Since Denmark (and other Scandinavian countries) 
has a two-tier board structure the impact of the supervisory board may be different. However, 
Randhøy and Nielsen (2002) find similar results based on Norwegian and Swedish data. Thus, it 
indicates that there exists a positive relation between board size and the level of compensation in 
settings characterised by both a one-tier and a two-tier board system. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relation between board size and executive compensation 
 
Pfeffer (1981) argues that inside board members are more loyal to management. This implies that 
executives can exert relatively more influence over inside board members as opposed to outside 
board members. However, there is mixed evidence as to whether boards are more effective when it 
consists of fewer inside members. Lambert et al (1993) and Boyd (1994) document a positive 
association between executive compensation and the percentage of outside directors, whereas 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) find that compensation is unrelated to the percentage of outside 
directors. Core et al. (1999) find a negative relation between executive compensation and the 
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percentage of inside directors. These results suggest that theory and empirical evidence are not in 
line. We examine if there is a positive relation between the percentage of inside board members and 
the level of executive compensation in privately held firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relation between the percentage of inside board members and 
executive compensation 
 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) argue that a separate management structure will lead to greater 
degree of independence to the board in various issues related to monitoring managerial 
performance. It is expected that boards that have an independent chairman will be more effective in 
designing a compensation contract and monitoring the performance of management. This also 
implies that if the executive serves on the board the independency of the board is reduced and it 
may affect, among other things, the design of an effective compensation contract. Core et al (1999) 
and Iyengar et al. (2005) confirm these predictions. They find that compensation levels are higher in 
firms where the executive is also the board chair. On the other hand, Angbazo and Narayanan 
(1997) and Conyon (1997) find no relation in their study of US and British firms, respectively. In 
Denmark, an executive is not allowed to serve as chairman of the board. However, an executive 
may serve as an ordinary board member. Even though the power of an executive as an ordinary 
board member is not equivalent to the power of the board chairman we conjecture that the board’s 
independency is reduced to an extent that may lead to inefficient compensation contracts. This 
implies that compensation contracts may compensate executives excessively. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: The level of compensation is higher in firms where the executive also serves on the 
board 
 
As noted in the introduction, the level of ownership concentration tends to be high in privately held 
firms as opposed to the often diffuse ownership structure of publicly traded firms. This provides 
owners in privately held firms with better economic incentives to monitor the actions taken by 
executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983). They also have better access to executives. These elements 
reduce the need for performance related pay. Several studies confirm this prediction. Core et al. 
(1999) and Haid and Yurtoglus (2006) find a negative association between the level of ownership 
concentration and executive compensation based on US and German data, respectively. We also 
 10
examine if the association between ownership concentration and executive compensation is 
negative in privately held firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2d: The level of executive compensation is lower in firms with a high level of ownership 
concentration 
 
Executive characteristics 
We also explore the impact of executive characteristics on the level of executive compensation. We 
explore five types of executive characteristics that may affect the level of executive compensation 
(hypotheses 3a-3e). 
 
One source of executive power is long tenure (Hill and Phan, 1991). Long tenure increases the 
chances that executives influence the selection of (some) board members. Further, long tenure also 
ensures stronger relations with board members. Thus, tenure may explain the level of executive 
compensation. The empirical evidence on the tenure hypothesis is mixed. Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1989) find a curve-linear relation between executive tenure and compensation. Attaway (2000) 
finds a positive association. O’Reilly et al. (1988), on the other hand, find a negative association. 
Finally, Randhøy and Nielsen (2002) find no association between tenure and the level of pay. Thus, 
previous empirical studies do not provide conclusive evidence in support for the tenure hypothesis. 
We examine the impact of tenure on executive compensation in privately held firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive association between executive tenure and executive 
compensation 
 
Larger and more complex organisations are more difficult to manage and therefore also attract 
better performing executives. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) theorise that the largest 
firms hire the better performing executives to maximise their productivity. Oetomo and Swan 
(2003) find that firm size is a partial proxy for managerial ability. Previous studies provide strong 
evidence in favour of the size hypothesis. Kaplan (1994) on Japanese data, Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) on UK and US data , Brunello et al (2001) on Italian data, Zhou (2000) on Canadian data, 
and Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) on German data all find a positive and significant association 
between executives’ pay and firm size. In fact, in a meta-analysis Tosi et al. (2000) conclude that 
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firm size accounts for more than 40% of the variance in executive pay while firm performance 
accounts for less than 5%. We, therefore, expect a positive association between executives’ pay and 
firm size. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a positive relation between firm size and executive compensation 
 
The CEO has the overall responsibility of a firm’s performance. This also explains the number of 
papers examining the relation between performance and CEO compensation. Although other 
executives (non-CEOs) such as the chief financial officer (CFO) and the chief developing officer 
are responsible for the performance of the company too, they will not have the same opportunities 
to affect the business as the CEO. Further, the level of responsibility is not the same as for the CEO. 
Thus, the pay to performance relation is expected to vary across different hierarchical levels. 
Murphy (1985) finds no differences in the pay to performance relation between CEOs, presidents 
and vice presidents. Ericsson and Lausten (2000), on the other hand, find small differences in the 
pay to performance relation across different management levels based on Danish data. We 
conjecture that the pay to performance relation is weaker for non-CEOs than for CEOs. 
 
Hypothesis 3c: The pay to performance relation is weaker for non-CEOs than for CEOs 
 
Companies characterised by a high level of managerial ownership already align the interests of the 
principal and agent. Executives who own shares in their companies have, therefore, a lesser need for 
direct compensation as they receive dividends and capital gains from their shareholdings. Lower 
direct compensation may also signal fiscal responsibility by the executive-owners (Ramaswamy et 
al., 2000). Hall and Liebman (1998) and Banghøj and Plenborg (2008) document that managerial 
ownership is more important than stock options and cash pay as a managerial incentive. Thus, in a 
Danish setting, where managerial ownership is more common than in the UK and the US [Conyon 
and Murphy (2000) and Gabrielsen et al. (2002)], we believe that it is important to include 
executives’ stock holdings when explaining the level of executive compensation. A number of 
studies examine the association between managerial ownership and the level of executive 
compensation. Core et al (1999) find that executive compensation in the US is a decreasing function 
of the executive’s ownership stake. Randhøy and Nielsen (2002) on both Norwegian and Swedish 
data, and Cheng and Firth (2005) on Hong Kong data find similar results. 
 12
 
Hypothesis 3d: Executive compensation is a decreasing function of the executive’s ownership stake 
 
There are reasons to believe that executive compensation may be a function of educational skills. 
Based on publicly traded data Chung and Pruitt (1996) find a positive, although insignificant, 
association between educational attainment and executive pay. Cole and Mehran (2008) find a 
positive and significant association between the level of education and executive pay in privately 
held firms. This indicates that there exists a positive association between educational attainment and 
executive compensation. 
 
Hypothesis 3e: There is a positive relation between educational attainment and executive 
compensation 
 
 
Quality of bonus plan 
To our knowledge previous studies that explore the pay to performance relation assume that the 
quality of the bonus plan is identical across executives. We challenge this view by arguing that the 
pay to performance relation is a function of the quality of the bonus plan. Inspired by Murphy 
(1999) we list four areas that need to be addressed when designing a bonus plan. First, the board 
needs to decide on an appropriate performance measure. Feltham and Xie (1994) point out that the 
literature has paid only limited attention to the fact that performance measures are frequently 
incomplete or imperfect representations of the economic consequences of the manager’s action. 
Thus, the choice of performance measure is not obvious. They recommend the use of only one 
performance measure if, and only if, the performance measure is perfectly congruent and noiseless. 
In other cases, more than one performance measure is recommended. Gibbs et al (2007) find that 
firms use incentive systems of multiple performance measures as a response to flaws in available 
performance measures. Thus, bonus plans that tend to use more than just one performance measure 
is considered to be of higher quality.  
 
Second, the literature on financial statement analysis [(see e.g. Bernstein and Wild (1998) and 
Penman (2007)] suggests that one dollar of earnings is valued differently by shareholders. Earnings 
generated from the core business (permanent earnings) are regarded as more valuable than earnings 
 13
based on transitory items (i.e. the impact of changes in accounting principles and unusual 
accounting items recognised as part of earnings). Thus, bonus plans that explicitly address the 
consequences of unusual items and changes in accounting principles on earnings are considered to 
be of higher quality than other contracts. 
 
Third, Murphy (2000) finds support for the use of external standards. He finds that income 
smoothing is prevalent in companies using internal standards (e.g. budget and last year’s result), but 
not in companies using external standards. This suggests that bonus plans based on external 
standards better capture the value contribution of executives. They are, therefore, considered to be 
of higher quality than bonus plans that rely on internal performance standards. 
 
Finally, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) suggest that the pay to performance structure should be  
linear since it mitigates the incentive to manage the performance measure. Non-linear bonus plans 
provide the executives with an incentive to manage earnings. For example, if the year-to-date 
performance indicates that annual performance will exceed that required to achieve the bonus cap, 
executives will either withhold effort or ‘move’ current earnings to future periods (Healy, 1985). 
Thus, linear bonus plans with no cap or floor are considered to be of higher quality than other bonus 
plans. In summary, a well designed bonus plan is expected to capture the actual value creation 
better than a poorly designed bonus plan and should, consequently, improve the pay to performance 
relation. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The positive pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans 
 
 
Sample 
According to Danish accounting legislation privately held firms need only provide limited 
information on executive compensation. Due to the lack of data, we made a questionnaire survey in 
the spring of 2007 in order to examine current practice for compensation among privately held 
firms. The questionnaire focuses on the technical aspects of accounting based bonus plans.1 To 
increase the likelihood that all relevant questions were included and that the questions were easily 
understood, six persons, four advisors and two executives, pre-tested the questionnaire. In addition, 
                                                          
1 A copy of the questionnaire may be obtained by request to the authors. 
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the questionnaire was tested by our colleagues. As a result of this pilot-project, we made some 
rephrasing, added a few extra options for answering selected questions and expanded the 
questionnaire with further relevant questions.  
 
The study is based on firms belonging to accounting class C (midsize and large firms). These firms 
are more representative for the Danish business community than publicly traded firms. It is also 
considered more likely that firms in class C would fill in the questionnaire than firms in class A and 
B (small firms), respectively. Organisations, firms from the public sector and funds are not included 
in the sample, as the incentive structure for those firms is different from other privately held firms. 
 
Based on the above criteria 2,127 firms were selected from the database Soliditet.2 500 of those 
were chosen randomly.3 Each of the 500 firms was contacted by phone in order to obtain e-mail 
addresses for every executive. If the executive board consisted of more than one member (CEO) all 
executives received the questionnaire. The outcome was 574 possible respondents. On April 27, 
2007 the questionnaire was mailed to the respondents via an e-mail service made available by 
Defgo. On May 21, 219 had opened the questionnaire and of those 191 respondents filled it in. This 
corresponds to a response rate of 33%, which is satisfactory for questionnaires (Petersen and 
Plenborg, 2007). Unfortunately, not all executives filled in questionnaire entirely, reducing sample 
size further. In addition, we excluded four outliers from our sample. Thus, depending on the model 
specification the number of observations in each test is between 122 and 150. The accounting data 
used in our study is retrieved from Soliditet. 
 
To clarify if firms that filled in the questionnaire, have specific characteristics (selection bias), we 
compared the respondent firms with the ones that did not reply. Data needed to do so were obtained 
from Soliditet. Firms that did not respond to the questionnaire had an average turnover of DKK 899 
million versus DKK 863 million for firms that accepted to participate. Average total assets was 
DKK 617 million for firms that did not participate versus DKK 584 million for firms that filled in 
the questionnaire. This indicates that there is not a large difference between firms that participate 
and those that chose not to. 
                                                          
2 Soliditet is a database containing information on firm specific data such as management board members, 
members of the supervisory board and corporate structure. Furthermore the database contains information 
from financial reports and ratios based on accounting information. Soliditet is part of Dun & Bradstreet. 
3 This took place in a random procedure in Microsoft Excel. 
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Research design 
To analyse the determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms we use an OLS 
regression in a multivariate framework: 
                                                                                                        
ln (executive compensation) = βnXi + εi     (1) 
 
ln (executive compensation) is defined as the natural logarithm of total salary plus bonus. Our 
survey data reveal that 35 executives also are awarded stock options. Due to data limitations we are 
not able to estimate the value of the awarded stock options. Thus, we cannot include them as part of 
compensation. Previous studies examining data from privately held firms ignore the impact of stock 
options (see for example Ke et al., 1999 and Cole and Mehran, 2008). We are able to distinguish 
executives who receive stock options in addition to bonus from executives who receive salary and 
bonus only. This allows us to run different types of robustness checks. First, we run a regression 
(equation 1) excluding executives who receive stock options. Second, we also include stock options 
as an explanatory variable in model (1). If the coefficient of stock options is not statistical different 
from zero, it indicates that stock options are equally distributed across respondents (and only the 
intercept will be affected by the omission of stock options). 
 
Xi is a vector of performance-, board-, ownership-, executive-, and quality-specific explanatory 
variables. We use three proxies for firm performance. Return on assets, defined as EBIT divided by 
total assets, return on equity, defined as net earnings divided by shareholders equity, and net 
earnings. Included as board variables are board size, defined as the number of board members, 
percentage of inside board members, and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the executive also 
serves on the board and 0 otherwise. Ownership concentration is defined as the percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholder.4 As executive specific variables we include tenure defined as the 
number of years that the executive has hold current position, size, measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets, a dummy variable that equal 1 if the executive is CEO and 0 otherwise, a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the executive holds stocks in their firm and 0 otherwise, and executive 
education as measured by dummy variables indicating the executive’s highest educational 
attainment (from primary and lower-secondary school to a graduate degree). 
                                                          
4 Alternative definitions of ownership concentration are also applied.  
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Our quality measure of bonus plans consists of four indicators. Each indicator receives a value 
between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the highest quality. The first quality indicator is the number of 
performance measures applied in each bonus plan. Bonus plans applying one or two performance 
measures obtain a score of 0.33 and 0.67, respectively. Bonus plans that apply three or more 
performance measures receive a score of 1. The second quality indicator is based on the level of 
noise in each performance measure. The information from the questionnaire allows us to rank each 
bonus plan based on the degree to which it considers the impact of transitory items and changes in 
accounting policies on the performance measures adopted. For example, if the bonus plan takes into 
account both transitory items and changes in accounting policies the bonus plan receives a score of 
1. The third indicator considers the quality of the performance standard. Bonus plans relying on an 
internal (external) standard receive a score of 0.33 (1). Bonus plans that rely on both an internal and 
external standard receive a score of 0.66. The final indicator is based on the pay to performance 
structure in each compensation contract. The questionnaire allows us to divide the bonus plans into 
twenty incentive zones depending on the cap and floor used. An incentive zone with no cap or floor 
receives a score of 1. A bonus plan with no incentive zone receives a score of 0. A factor analysis 
suggests that the four indicators load on the same maximum-likelihood factor. Thus, we also create 
a quality index based on the average score of the four indicators. Each bonus plan is ranked from 0 
to 1 based on the average score. 
 
To rule out alternative explanations to our findings we include leverage and industry as control 
variables. Lippert and More (1994) and Lippert and Porter (1997) find that executive compensation 
is higher for firms with higher risk (measured as stock volatility). Since stock prices are not 
observable for privately held firms, we adopt the level of debt to assets ratio as a proxy for risk.5 
Murphy (1999) finds that the level of compensation is lower for regulated industries such as 
utilities. Thus, we include a dummy variable that equals 1 for regulated industries and 0 otherwise.6  
Finally, εi is a normally distributed error term. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Since market values are not observable for privately held firms with apply book values of debt to assets. 
6 There are only four regulated (telecom and utilities) companies included in the sample and they do not 
affect the results reported. We therefore report the results without including the industry dummy. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are reported in table 1. The average salary including bonus is DKK 1.9 
million. Firms included in the sample generate an average return on assets of 8.5%. The average 
(median) return on equity equals 29.4% (19.1%) which reflects that leverage affects shareholders’ 
return positively. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
The descriptive statistics on the corporate governance variables show that 34% of the executives 
also hold a position on the supervisory board. Core et al. (1999) find that 76% of the CEOs also 
serve as chairman of the board. Thus, in a one-tier system like the US it seems more common for 
the executive to serve on the board than in a two-tier system like the Danish. The average size of the 
supervisory board is 5.8. This is generally lower than found in publicly traded companies. Core et al 
(1999) find that the average board size of publicly traded US firms is 13. Randhøy and Nielsen 
(2002) find that the average board size for publicly traded Norwegian and Swedish firms is 7.2. 
Further, on average 69% of the board members are classified as insiders. This indicates that private 
held firms more frequently rely on insiders than publicly traded firms. For example, Core et al. find 
that only 32% of the board members in their sample are classified as insiders. The average 
ownership concentration is 72% which is considerably higher than found in studies applying 
publicly traded firms. This confirms that privately held firms have a higher level of ownership 
concentration than in publicly traded firms. 
 
The descriptive statistics on the executive characteristics reveal that the average tenure is 5.8 years. 
The average age of the executive is 53.5 years. Cole and Mehran (2008) find that the average age of 
executives in privately held US firms is almost 50 years. Approximately two-third of the executives 
in our sample holds the position of CEO. On average 34% of the executives own stocks in their firm 
and more than half of the executives hold a graduate degree. Cole and Mehran (2008) find that the 
executives included in their sample have a lower degree of education than executives in our sample. 
Further, most of the US executives own stocks in their firm. The differences between the executive 
characteristics found in Cole and Mehran (2008) and in our sample are most likely due to 
differences in firm size. For example, the average turnover for the privately held US firms in 
Mehran (2008) is $ 2.1 million. In our sample, the average turnover is $ 169 million (not reported). 
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Finally, the descriptive statistics on the quality of the bonus plans reveal that many bonus plans do 
not consider the impact of transitory items and changes in accounting policies on the chosen 
performance measures. On the other hand, more than half of the bonus plans include three or more 
performance measures. Descriptive statistics on the quality index based on the average score of the 
four indicators show that no bonus plan meets the criteria for ‘best practice’; i.e. obtaining a score 
of 1 (the highest score is 0.75). Further, the quality index score does not seem to be clustered 
around a certain value but is normally distributed around 0.46. This increases the likelihood that the 
quality index may explain differences in the pay to performance relation across executives. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
The correlations reported in table 2 provide preliminary evidence on some of the hypotheses. First, 
performance as expressed by ROA does not seem to explain the variation in executive 
compensation. Both the correlation coefficient on ROAt and ROAt-1 are close to zero and 
insignificant. Second, the number of board members seems to be positively correlated with level of 
compensation. The correlation coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The correlation coefficients 
on the other corporate governance characteristics remain close to zero and insignificant. Third, size 
is, in line with previous studies, highly correlated with level of compensation and significant at the 
1% level. The executive’s educational attainment also seems to explain the level of compensation. 
The coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level. Further, CEOs seem to receive a higher 
level of compensation than other executives. Other executive characteristics such as tenure and 
executives that own stocks in their firm do not seem to explain the variation in executive 
compensation. Finally, the correlation coefficient between the quality index and executive 
compensation is close to zero and insignificant. It should be noted that the correlations between the 
explanatory variables do not indicate the presence of multicollinearity. 
 
 
Empirical results 
The results of our tests of the different hypotheses are reported in table 3. Tosi et al. (2000) 
conclude that firm size accounts for more than 40% of the variance in executive pay. Thus, even 
though we define size as a proxy for executive skills, we include the variable in all our tests. In 
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table 3, panel A executive compensation is regressed on ROAt. The coefficient is positive as 
expected but not significantly different from zero. In line with our hypothesis we find a positive but 
weak pay to performance relation. The coefficient on size is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
which confirms that size explains a significant part of the variations in executive compensation. The 
coefficient on leverage (solvency)7  is positive and significant at all conventional levels. This result 
contradicts the finding of Lippert and Porter (1997), who find that executive compensation is higher 
for firms with higher risk. Our result indicates a negative relation between risk and executive 
compensation.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
In table 3, panel B we examine if executive compensation is a function of past-year performance. 
Even though the coefficient on ROAt-1 is positive and higher than the coefficient on ROAt it 
remains insignificant. However, it indicates that executive compensation to a larger degree is 
determined by past-year performance than current-year performance. 
 
In table 3, panel C we examine the association between corporate governance characteristics and 
executive compensation. In line with Core et al. (1999) and Randhøy and Nielsen (2002) we find 
that large supervisory boards are associated with excessive executive compensation. On the other 
hand, the coefficients on the percentage of inside board members, executive ownership, and 
ownership concentration are insignificant. This indicates that neither of these corporate governance 
characteristics explains the variation in executive compensation. The coefficients on the variables 
reported in table 3, panel A remain qualitatively the same and with similar significance levels. 
 
The coefficients on executive characteristics are reported in table 3, panel D. The coefficient on the 
CEO indicator reflects that the CEOs level of compensation is significantly higher than other 
executives’ level of compensation. Further, the pay to performance relation is significantly stronger 
for CEOs than for other executives. While the coefficient on ROAt is 0.45 (-0.58+1.03) for CEOs it 
is -0.58 for other executives. These results are in line with our predictions. Although other 
executives are also responsible for the performance of the firm they will not have the same 
opportunities to affect the business as the CEOs. An F-test (not reported) reveals that the coefficient 
                                                          
7 Please note that we define leverage as shareholder’s equity divided by total assets. This is equivalent to a 
traditional solvency measure. Thus, an increase in the solvency measure reflects a decrease in the leverage 
measure.  
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on ROAt for CEOs remains insignificant. Thus, despite the significant difference in the coefficients 
on ROAt across executives the performance measure does not explain the variation in executive 
compensation. 
 
In line with the results of Cole and Mehran (2008) the coefficient on executives’ educational 
attainment is positive and significant at conventional levels. This supports that the level of 
education explains some of the variation in executive compensation. It also supports the extensive 
literature that examines the impact of education on earnings. For example, Green and Riddell 
(2001) find that each additional year of education raises earnings by approximately 8%. 
 
Contrary to Core et al. (1999) and Randhøy and Nielsen (2002) we do not find that executive 
compensation is a decreasing function of the executive’s ownership stake. The coefficient on 
executive ownership is slightly positive but insignificant.  The coefficient on tenure also remains 
insignificant indicating that this variable does not explain the variation in executive compensation.  
 
The quality of the bonus plan is the final category of explanatory variables that we examine. We 
conjecture that the pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans.8  
As shown in table 3, panel E the interaction term between performance and the quality indicator is 
insignificant. Thus, our measure of quality does not improve the pay to performance relation. This 
may be due to a quality measure that suffers from biases or that the board chose an optimal contract 
given the firm’s informational environment and its demand for high quality executives. In the 
robustness check below we explore this finding in further detail. 
 
As a final test we include all explanatory variables in model (1).9 The results reported in table 3, 
panel F generally support the findings listed above. The coefficients on firm size, board size, and 
CEO versus other executives remain positive and significant at conventional levels. It supports that 
these variables explain the variation in executive compensation. The coefficient on educational 
attainment is positive but insignificant (p<0.11) in the full model.10 
  
                                                          
8 Please note, that only firms with bonus plans are included in the test. This almost halved the sample size. 
9 Due to data restrictions we exclude the quality measure of bonus plans from our test. 
10 The coefficient on educational attainment is positive and significant in other specifications. This also 
includes the robustness checks described below. 
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Robustness checks 
In order to further strengthening our results we conduct a range of additional tests. First, we use 
return on equity and net earnings, respectively, as proxies for performance. In most specifications 
the coefficients on both variables remain close to zero and insignificant. In a few specifications, the 
coefficient on return on equity was positive and significant at the 5% level. However, the overall 
findings support that performance does not explain the variation in executive compensation. 
 
We further examine if the pay to performance relation is non-linear. One may argue that the pay to 
performance relation is only positive for firms reporting positive ROA. The basic idea is that 
executives still receive a salary even when ROA is negative. To examine if this holds true we create 
an indicator variable that equals one when ROA is positive and zero otherwise. We multiply the 
indicator variable with the performance to explore if the pay to performance relation is non-linear. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term remains insignificant indicating that the pay to 
performance relation is similar for firms generating both positive and negative ROAs. 
 
In addition, we use ln (sales) and ln (employees) as proxies for size. The coefficients on both 
proxies remain positive and significant at the 1% level. Further, the coefficients and significance 
levels of the other variables remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
We examine alternative specifications of the ownership concentration variable. First, we define 
ownership concentration as the sum of the three largest shareholders. The coefficient on this 
alternative ownership specification remains positive but insignificant. Second, we examine if the 
type of owners impact the level of executive compensation. Specifically, we make a distinction 
between institutional -, firm-/family-11, foundation-, and state ownership. The coefficients on the 
different ownership categories remain insignificant. 
 
Our quality indicator of the bonus plans did not improve the pay to performance relation. One 
explanation may be that we add four quality indicators that provide different types of information. 
Thus, we examine how each of the quality indicators’ influences the pay to performance relation. 
The results are reported in table 4. 
                                                          
11 The way that ownership data is reported in Denmark makes it difficult to make a distinction between 
family- and firm ownership, respectively. Thus, we combine the two types of ownership into one ownership 
variable. 
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[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
As can be seen from table 4, the coefficients on the interaction terms take different signs. While 
coefficients on number of performance measures and performance standard, respectively, are 
negative the coefficients on the other two quality indicators are positive. Thus, the quality indicators 
seem to provide different information on the pay to performance relation. None of the coefficients 
are, however, significantly different from zero. 
 
We also used an alternative indicator for the quality of the compensation contracts. The participants 
in our survey rated the compensation contract based on their perception of the quality of the 
compensation contract. We used that rating as an indicator of the overall quality of the 
compensation contract and created a new interaction term (ROA*rating). We conjecture that that 
the pay to performance relation will be stronger for compensation contracts receiving a high rating. 
The coefficient on the interaction term remains close to zero and insignificant. Thus, our different 
proxies for quality do not improve the pay to performance relation. 
 
As mentioned above, we cannot include stock options as part of executive compensation due to data 
limitations. However, we repeat our test excluding executives that receive stock options as part of 
their compensation. The results remain similar to the results based on the full sample. Finally, we 
also include stock options as an explanatory (indicator) variable in model (1). The coefficient on the 
stock options remains close to zero and insignificant. This indicates that stock options are equally 
distributed across respondents. Thus, the results from the different robustness checks support the 
statistics reported in tables 1-4. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
This paper documents how four different categories of determinants affect executive compensation 
in privately held firms in Denmark. In line with our predictions we find that the pay to performance 
relation is weak. We find a stronger pay to performance relation for CEOs than for other types of 
executives. Corporate governance characteristics only vaguely explain determinants of executive 
compensation. Board size is the only corporate governance characteristic that explains variations in 
executive compensation. On the other hand, we find that executive characteristics like skills (size), 
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executive position and educational level are important in explaining variations in executive 
compensation. Finally, as a novelty we allow the quality of the bonus plan to vary across 
executives. Contrary to our expectations we do not find a stronger pay to performance relation in 
firms with better designed bonus plans. 
 
Our study confirms that research on privately held firms that is based on an institutional setting that 
deviates from the UK and the US, respectively, offer insightful results. For example, the weak pay 
to performance relation is most likely explained by the fact that performance related pay is less 
common in privately held firms in Denmark. Further, in contrast to Core et al. (1999) we do not 
find that the level of executive compensation is higher in firms where the executive also serves on 
the board. This is most likely due to the fact that executives in Denmark are not allowed to serve as 
chairman of the supervisory board. 
 
Although the coefficient on our quality index remains insignificant we believe that one way to 
expand the study is to explore each compensation contract in further detail. Previous studies assume 
that the quality of the executive compensation contract is identical. Future studies may shed light on 
why some compensation contracts contain only one performance measure while other contracts 
include three or more performance measures. Further, why do some contracts ignore the impact of 
transitory items on performance measures adopted while other contracts carefully consider these 
items? And why is the pay to performance relation not stronger for firms that carefully consider the 
impact of transitory items? These issues ought to be further examined. 
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Variable n Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max
ln (LEVELPAY) 163 14.31              12.54                13.93           14.27           14.62           15.88                
LEVELPAY 163 1,871,388       280,000            1,250,000    1,575,000    2,231,250    7,875,000         
Performance variables
ROAt 189 0.0852            (0.4307)             0.0112         0.0716         0.1510         0.6281              
ROAt-1 181 0.1075            (0.5968)             0.0199         0.0682         0.1531         1.1343              
ROEt 189 0.2940            15.0675            0.0564         0.1914         0.3734         40.1682            
ROEt-1 181 0.3282            (2.9674)             0.0478         0.1777         0.3595         18.1069            
EARNINGSt 190 63,514            (680,200)           2,292           13,216         41,671         2,412,000         
EARNINGSt-1 189 52,142            (686,945)           1,379           11,395         38,181         1,803,000         
Corporate governance variables
Executive member of board 182 0.3407 0 0 0 1 1
Number of board members 179 5.80 3 5 5 7 10
Relative number of insiders 177 0.69 0.11 0.40 0.67 1.00 1.00
Ownership concentration 191 0.72 0.00 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00
Executive caracteristics variables
ln (Assets) 189 12.49              10.09                11.58           12.35           13.37           19.14                
CEO DUMMY 180 0.69 0 0 1 1 1
Executive ownership 186 0.3444 0 0 0 1 1
Option dummy 183 0.2404 0 0 0 0 1
Tenure 168 5.79 0 2 5 8 31
Age 182 53.55 33 43 48 53 64
Educational attainment 183 5.81 0 5 7 7 7
Quality variables
SCALECAP 93 0.42 0.00 0.15 0.20 1.00 1.00
SCALESTANDARD 123 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00
SCALEACCOUNTING 96 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.67
SCALENRPERF 131 0.76 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00
SCALEQUALITY 70 0.46 0.19 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.75
Control variable
Leverage 189 0.3000 -0.5542 0.1731 0.2860 0.4533 0.8928
Descriptive statistics
Table 1
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Log level of pay is defined as the natural logarith of the sum of total salary and bonus for the fiscal year
ROAt(t-1) is the return on assets (lag return on assets) defined as EBIT divided by beginning of the fiscal year total assets.
ROEt(t-1) is the return on equity (lag return on equity) defined as net earnings divided by beginning of the fiscal year book value of equity
EARNINGSt(t-1) is the net results (lag net result) in thousands for the fiscal year
Executive member of board is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the executive holds a position on the supervisory board and zero otherwise
Number of board members is defined as the number of members of the supervisory board.
Relative number of insiders is defined as the percentage of board members who are insiders.
Ownership concentration is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
Ln Assets is the natural logarithm of beginning of fiscal year total assets.
CEO DUMMY is an indicator variable that equals one if executive hold the position as CEO and zero otherwise
Executive ownership is an indicator variable that equals one if the executive ownes shares in the company and zero otherwise
Option is an indicator variable that equals one if the executive holds options in the company and zero otherwise
Tenure is defined as the number of years the executive has hold the current position in the firm.
Age is the age of the executive
Educational attainment is an indicator variable running from 1-7 where 1 indicates primary and lower-secondary school and 7 indicates
a graduate degree.
SCALECAP is a variable that (from 0-1) indicates the span over which the incentive zone is in the compensation contract.
SCALESTANDARD indicates the use of internal, combination or external standards, where external standards receive the highest score
SCALEACCOUNTING indicates whether the performance measures in compensation contracts is corrected for changes in accounting 
policies or transitory items. 1 indicates the highest level.
SCALENRPERF indicates how many performance measures are included in the compensation contract. 3 or more is coded identically.
SCALEQUALITY is a qualityindex that ranks each bonus plan based on four quality indicators. Each bonus plan is ranked from 0 to 1 based 
on the average score of the four quality indicators
Leverage is defined as the book value of equity divided by total assets.
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ROAt ROAt-1
Executive 
member of 
board
Number of 
board 
members
Relative 
number of 
insiders
Ownership 
concentration ln Assets
CEO 
DUMMY
Executive 
ownership 
dummy Tenure Age
Educational 
attainment Leverage
SCALE-
QUALITY
logLEVELPAY 0.02954 0.10548 -0.06354 0.29005 0.06391 0.05962 0.44129 0.15983 0.01074 0.06286 0.00999 0.17229 0.12393 0.05175
0.709 0.19 0.4218 0.0002 0.4265 0.4497 <.0001 0.0463 0.8921 0.451 0.9009 0.0309 0.1161 0.6798
162 156 162 159 157 163 162 156 162 146 158 157 162 66
ROAt 0.70695 0.06093 -0.10574 0.07384 0.02574 -0.10038 -0.00569 0.02338 0.16558 -0.24727 -0.07636 0.29378 0.19413
<.0001 0.4165 0.1613 0.3315 0.7252 0.1694 0.9399 0.7527 0.033 0.0008 0.3069 <.0001 0.1073
181 180 177 175 189 189 178 184 166 181 181 189 70
ROAt-1 0.0897 -0.11611 0.07508 0.09727 -0.077 0.02852 0.10083 0.10549 -0.03166 -0.01629 0.37007 0.13261
0.2405 0.1316 0.3334 0.1927 0.3029 0.7112 0.1817 0.1829 0.6792 0.8315 <.0001 0.281
173 170 168 181 181 171 177 161 173 173 181 68
Corporate governance variables
Executive member of board -0.30075 0.24153 0.01322 -0.32678 0.25502 0.26975 0.05843 -0.07599 -0.08665 -0.01845 -0.01067
<.0001 0.0012 0.8594 <.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.4588 0.3175 0.2528 0.8058 0.9301
179 177 182 180 175 181 163 175 176 180 70
Number of board members -0.33298 -0.14268 0.42211 -0.13434 -0.05739 -0.03345 0.09972 0.19694 0.04192 -0.03182
<.0001 0.0567 <.0001 0.078 0.4467 0.6735 0.1918 0.0094 0.5795 0.7952
177 179 177 173 178 161 173 173 177 69
Relative number of insiders 0.06355 -0.08351 0.13312 -0.11883 0.0065 -0.15031 0.09068 -0.1484 0.24018
0.4007 0.2719 0.0817 0.1162 0.9352 0.0497 0.2382 0.05 0.0468
177 175 172 176 159 171 171 175 69
Ownership concentration 0.04705 -0.03348 -0.25663 -0.11237 -0.04113 -0.07127 0.0247 -0.08181
0.5203 0.6554 0.0004 0.147 0.5815 0.3377 0.7359 0.5008
189 180 186 168 182 183 189 70
Executive caracteristics variables
ln Assets -0.23283 -0.09798 0.08477 0.07938 0.13472 0.11117 0.19876
0.0018 0.1858 0.2775 0.2881 0.0706 0.1278 0.099
178 184 166 181 181 189 70
CEO DUMMY 0.05123 0.04713 0.05424 -0.15087 0.00295 -0.07582
0.4983 0.5553 0.4797 0.0469 0.9688 0.5389
177 159 172 174 178 68
Executive ownership dummy 0.0117 0.09216 0.04743 0.02363 0.027
0.8807 0.2198 0.5272 0.7502 0.8244
167 179 180 184 70
Tenure -0.03842 -0.03232 0.12601 -0.00128
0.6274 0.6831 0.1057 0.9921
162 162 166 62
Age 0.01915 -0.06087 0.00664
0.8009 0.4157 0.9572
176 181 68
Educational attainment -0.00498 0.13765
0.9469 0.263
181 68
Control variable
Leverage 0.17093
0.1571
70
See table 1 for description of variables. 
Table 2
Correlations between executive compensation and determinants
 31
Independent variables A B C D E F
Intercept 12.50573 12.34888 12.01856 11.77944 12.11083 11.7356
43.44*** 39.75*** 36.79*** 34.98*** 21.17*** 32.88***
ROAt + 0.13328 -0.02982 0.15985 -0.5794 0.10675 -0.58933
0.58 -0.1 0.71 -1.11 0.08 -1.15
ROAt-1 + 0.20531
0.88
ln Assets + 0.1355 0.15025 0.14366 0.15601 0.17895 0.1401
5.95*** 6.05*** 5.44*** 6.61*** 4.12*** 5.39***
Corporate governance
Executive member of board + 0.12107 0.04994
1.67* 0.66
Number of board members + 0.03323 0.03896
1.79* 2.2**
Relative number of insiders + 0.19427 0.04899
1.63 0.42
Ownership concentration - 0.03228 0.09447
0.41 1.18
Executive caracteristics
CEO DUMMY + 0.2368 0.18727
2.76*** 2.16**
Interaction perf*CEO DUMMY + 1.02682 0.97168
1.82* 1.75*
Executive ownership dummy - 0.01535 0.03426
0.24 0.48
Tenure + 0.00479 0.00662
0.71 0.98
Educational attainment + 0.05197 0.03586
2.35** 1.6
Quality of contract
SCALEQUALITY -0.25459
-0.49
Interaction perf*SCALEQUALITY + -0.223
-0.01
Control 
Leverage + 0.32032 0.22253 0.33316 0.21901 0.48707 0.2876
1.98** 1.27 2.05** 1.38 1.82* 1.83*
N 158 152 152 129 64 125
Adjusted R2 20.20 20.66 26.61 38.74 21.13 40.90
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
See table 1 for description of variables
Regression of log level of pay on performance, size, Corporate Governance variables executive characteristics and quality of contract
TABLE 3
PANELPredict
ed sign
 
 
 
 
Independent variable A B C D E
Number of 
perf. 
measures
Accounting 
quality
Performance 
Standards
Incentive 
span
Aggregated 
quality 
measure
Intercept 12.6743 12.34095 12.37307 12.41483 12.20829
33.57*** 28.43*** 39.58*** 26.75*** 21.03***
ROA + 1.65821 0.17332 0.8413 -0.13063 -0.032
1.56 0.34 0.88 -0.3 -0.02
Log Assets + 0.14314 0.16437 0.13161 0.16073 0.18207
4.78*** 4.86*** 4.17*** 4.40*** 4.11***
Quality of Contract + -0.18967 -0.12943 0.86907 -0.14379 -0.23981
-1.19 0.65 1.97* -0.96 -0.46
Interaction perf*Quality of  contract + -1.56417 0.43724 -1.41056 0.78637 0.65707
-1.3 0.35 -0.64 0.92 0.24
N 114 87 107 83 64
Adjusted R2 20.5 18.91 17.42 19.43 18.03
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
See table 1 for description of variables. 
PANELPredict
ed sign
Regression of log level of pay on performance, size and quality of contract
TABLE 4
 
 
 
 
